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FOREWORD:
LEGAL MALPRACTICE IS NO LONGER THE
PROFESSION'S DIRTY LITTLE SECRET
Susan Saab Fortney*
In 1994, Professor Manuel R. Ramos published a law review article
called, Legal Malpractice: The Profession's Dirty Little Secret.' As
suggested by the title, Professor Ramos argued that legal malpractice
was a "taboo subject" that has been "ignored by the legal profession,
law schools, mandatory continuing legal education ("CLE")
programs, and even by scholarly and lay publications."2 Thirty years
later, legal malpractice is an ever-present threat that lawyers cannot
afford to ignore.
On a daily basis we are bombarded with reports of lawyers and
their firms being named in malpractice suits and disqualification matters.
In fact, a daily electronic newsletter digests many of these stories.3 On a
typical day, the newsletter includes ten to fifteen accounts of matters in
which lawyers are on the hot seat. Lawyers appear to be keenly
interested in reading and talking about the fates of others. Some may be
interested in learning from the misfortunes of others. Many others may
think: "There, but for the grace of God, go I."
Despite the fact that lawyers are keenly interested in learning about
legal malpractice issues, and are directly impacted by jurisprudential
* Professor, Texas A&M University School of Law. Professor Fortney organized the April
1, 2015, Hofstra Ethics Conference, "Lawyers as Targets: Suing, Prosecuting and Defending
Lawyers." At the time of the Conference, she served as the Howard Lichtenstein Distinguished
Professor of Legal Ethics at Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University and Director of
the Hofstra Institute for the Study of Legal Ethics. She thanks Peter Guinnane, the Editor-in-Chief
of the Hofstra Law Review, and the other members of the Hofstra Law Review for their dedication
and great work on the Conference, the related articles, and the numerous essays dedicated to
Professor Monroe Freedman.
1. Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice: The Profession 's Dirty Little Secret, 47 VAND. L.
REv. 1657 (1994).
2. Id. at 1658-59 (citations omitted).
3. For a window into the types of stories that are published daily, see Legal Ethics, LAw360,
https://www.law360.com/legalethics (last visited Feb. 15, 2016).
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developments related to professional liability claims, there is limited
scholarship tackling legal malpractice topics, even when compared to the
growing body of scholarship devoted to general legal ethics concerns.
To help address that gap, we organized the 2015 Hofstra Ethics
Conference called, "Lawyers as Targets: Suing, Prosecuting and
Defending Lawyers," ("Lawyers as Targets") sponsored by the Institute
for the Study of Legal Ethics at the Maurice A. Deane School of Law at
Hofstra University ("Institute"). It was possible because of the generous
support of the Abraham J. Gross '78 Conference and Lecture Fund
("Gross Lecture Fund").
We believed that this was worthwhile because the majority of
lawyers in private practice appear to be more concerned about civil
liability, as opposed to disciplinary liability. Thus, the call for papers for
the conference invited works examining the changing landscape of legal
malpractice claims and litigation.
The Institute sponsored the conference, and the Gross Lecture Fund
provided generous support for it. At the time that we organized the
conference, Eric Lane, Dean and Eric J. Schmertz Distinguished
Professor of Public Law and Public Service at the Maurice A. Deane
School of Law at Hofstra University, and I planned to honor Professor
Monroe H. Freedman at the 2015 Hofstra Ethics Conference. Over the
last three decades, Professor Freedman, a leading authority in legal
ethics, contributed to the Hofstra Ethics Conferences being regarded as a
leading national forum for discussions of legal ethics. Therefore, we
wanted to honor and surprise Professor Freedman by dedicating the 2015
conference to him. Sadly, Professor Freedman died just weeks before the
conference. Nevertheless, Dean Lane dedicated the conference to
Professor Freedman and opened the conference by announcing that the
Institute will continue the biennial conferences, ethics fellowships for
outstanding students interested in the study of legal ethics, publication of
the New York Legal Ethics Reporter,4 legal ethics scholars' roundtables,
and other ethics programming. As stated in the announcement of the
naming, the Institute will "continue to create scholarship and
commentary in the tradition of Monroe, whose prolific writing never
ceased to provoke us."5
4. The New York Legal Ethics Reporter is an electronic publication that runs legal ethics
articles and commentaries of interest to New York practitioners and academics. N.Y. LEGAL ETHics
REP., http://www.newyorklegalethics.com (last visited Feb. 15, 2016). The publication is co-
sponsored by the firm of Frankfurt Kumit Klein & Selz PC and the Maurice A. Deane School of
Law at Hofstra University. Id.
5. A Tribute to Monroe H. Freedman, HOFsTRA L., http://law.hofstra.edu/
facultyandresearch/centers/isle/tribute/index.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2016).
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The naming of the Monroe H. Freedman Institute for the Study of
Legal Ethics is a fitting tribute, as well. As noted by Professor Alan
Dershowitz and others, Professor Freedman is widely recognized as a
leader in the field of legal ethics, with many referring to him as the
father of modem legal ethics.' Since his death, a number of academics
and practitioners have written eloquently about his influence and many
contributions.' At the 2016 annual meeting of the American Association
of Law Professors, the Professional Responsibility and Criminal Justice
Sections co-sponsored a three-hour program called, "Ethics in Criminal
Practice-The Hardest Questions Today: A Conversation in Honor of
Monroe H. Freedman." The Hofstra Law Review will publish articles
written by panelists who participated in that program in its Volume 44,
Issue 4. This Symposium Issue of the Hofstra Law Review includes three
essays paying tribute to Professor Freedman. First, Stuart Rabinowitz,
the President of Hofstra University, shares his perspectives on Professor
Freedman as a dean, teacher, and colleague.8 The second essay, written
by Dean Eric Lane, provides personal insights relating to the influence
of Professor Freedman.9 Professor Roy Simon, the Emeritus Howard
Lichtenstein Distinguished Professor of Legal Ethics at Hofstra Law
School, contributes the third tribute piece in this Issue. Professor Simon
chronicles how Professor Freedman led the effort to make Hofstra Law
School one of the preeminent institutions devoted to legal ethics
education, scholarship, and programming. 0
Articles written by the speakers at ihe Lawyers as Targets
conference follow the tribute pieces. Each of the conference articles
tackles a different aspect of legal malpractice and civil litigation matters
in which lawyers are respondents. The first two articles examine legal
malpractice in particular practice settings. In her article, Aggregate
Settlements and Attorney Liability: The Evolving Landscape, Professor
Lynn Baker examines the legal ethics and malpractice issues related to
professional liability rules and the common law related to aggregate
settlements.'" As she points out, this rule goes to the heart of an
increasing number of very large liability claims against lawyers who
6. See Margalit Fox, Monroe H. Freedman, Influential Voice in Legal Ethics, Dies at 86,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2015, at A19.
7. See generally A Special Section: Monroe H. Freedman, Father of Legal Ethics-A Life of
Infinite Value, 23 PROF. LAW. 2 (2015).
8. Stuart Rabinowitz, A Tribute to Monroe Freedman, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 269 (2016).
9. Eric Lane, Remarks at Monroe Freedman's Memorial, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 273 (2016).
10. Roy Simon, Monroe Freedman: Friends, Role Model, and Colleague, 44 HoFSTRA L.
REV. 275 (2016).
11. Lynn A. Baker, Aggregate Settlements and Attorney Liability: The Evolving Landscape,
44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 291 (2016).
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represented plaintiffs who reached settlements in mass tort cases.
Professor Baker discusses the genesis of the rule and its application.
After dissecting the rule, she identifies additional requirements set forth
in ABA Formal Ethics Opinion 06-4382 and the American Law
Institute's Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation.3 After
examining the current interpretations of the aggregate settlement rule
("the Rule"), she offers a normative theory to "mitigate the current
interpretative confusion regarding which settlements are 'aggregate
settlements' and what client disclosures are mandated by the Rule."' 4
Transactional lawyers, like litigators, can easily become targets in
legal malpractice cases. Professor Vincent R. Johnson examines the
liability exposure of a subgroup of lawyers who handle international
business transactions. In introducing his article called Legal Malpractice
in International Business Transactions, Professor Johnson suggests that
claims involving international business transactions might be a time
bomb. 5 Professor Johnson explains how, regardless of whether a lawyer
normally represents domestic entities or represents transnational
companies, lawyers face increased liability exposure when they handle
business matters with international aspects. He analyzes reported legal
malpractice cases involving international business transaction work and
theories that could be asserted against lawyers. The discussion
underscores the importance of lawyers understanding the various laws
and rules related to international business transactions, including legal
provisions drawn from American state and federal common law and
statutes, international conventions, customary business practices, and
foreign legal systems. 6 Given what may be staggering malpractice
liability, Professor Johnson concludes by urging lawyers to devote
attention to adopting prudent professional practices and mitigating
malpractice risks.' 7
The next four articles in this Issue examine issues related to legal
malpractice litigation. The article, Reflections of an Ethics Expert and a
Lawyer Who Retains Him, by Professor Michael Hoeflich and Mr.
William Skepnek, deals with legal malpractice experts.'" As suggested
by the title of their article, Professor Hoeflich and Mr. Skepnek provide
12. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-438 (2006).
13. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW: AGGREGATE LITIGATION (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
14. Id. at 291.
15. Vincent R. Johnson, Legal Malpractice in International Business Transactions, 44
HOFSTRA L. REV. 325 (2016).
16. Id. at 325-29.
17. Id. at 350-51.
18. Michael Hoeflich & William Skepnek, Reflections of an Ethics Expert and a Lawyer Who
Retains Him, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 353 (2016).
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different perspectives on the role and approach of experts in preventing
and litigating malpractice actions. In bringing and defending a legal
malpractice case, experts are normally essential to establish the standard
of care unless a lawyer's "lack of care and skill is so obvious that the
trier of fact can find negligence as a matter of common knowledge."19
Because expert testimony can make or break a legal malpractice case,
the article provides valuable insights to both lawyers who hire experts
and to those who agree to serve as experts.
Professors Herbert Kritzer and Neil Vidmar consider the dynamics
of the case-within-a-case feature of legal malpractice cases that requires
that the plaintiff prove that she would have recovered or prevailed in the
underlying matter for which the defendant-lawyer had been hired. In
their article, LawKyers on Trial: Juror Hostility in Legal Malpractice
Trials, Professors Kritzer and Vidmar consider whether jurors' hostility
toward lawyers contributes to the jurors finding negligence in legal
malpractice cases involving the case-within-a-case requirement.2" The
authors draw on the findings from a fascinating Internet experiment in
which they evaluated respondents' decisions in two contexts. In the first,
the tortfeasor was the defendant in an underlying tort case, such as an
automobile case.2 ' The second involved cases in which the tortfeasor
being sued for malpractice was the plaintiffs lawyer in the underlying
tort case. For the second set of scenarios, the respondents were told that
the defendant-lawyer was not contesting the allegation that the lawyer
breached some duty.22 Rather, they were asked to only decide whether
the original tortfeasors in the underlying cases had been negligent or
what damages were due the plaintiff or both.23 This approach was
designed to test the following hypotheses: (1) juries are more likely to
find for the plaintiff when the defendant who will have to pay any
damages is the plaintiff's former lawyer; and (2) juries award more in
damages when the defendant is the plaintiffs former lawyer.24 Based on
the study results, each involving different underlying cases (automobile
accident, products liability, and medical malpractice), the researchers
only found clear support for hypotheses in the premises liability case.
19. SUSAN SAAB FORTNEY & VINCENT R. JOHNSON, LEGAL MALPRACTICE LAW: PROBLEMS
AND PREVENTION 77 (2d ed. 2015) (quoting Television Cap. Corp. v. Paxson Comme'n Corp., 894
A.2d 461, 469 (D.C. 2006)).
20. Herbert Kritzer & Neil Vidmar, Lawyers on Trial: Juror Hostility in Legal Malpractice
Trials, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 375 (2016).
21. Id. at 383.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 397 (describing the difference between the amounts awarded in the experimental
20151
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Although the findings may suggest some hostility toward lawyers
generally, the authors did not believe that the findings supported the
conclusion that jurors wanted to punish lawyers.26 The article points to
the value of not merely accepting commonly-held notions about jurors'
views of lawyers, but rather to devoting more time and resources to
gathering reliable data, including information from juror simulation
studies. Such information can be used by plaintiffs' lawyers evaluating
whether to bring and try cases, and by the lawyers and insurers
defending malpractice claims.
Once sued, lawyers must carefully decide the best course of action
to defend against a malpractice claim. In addition to denying liability
and attempting to demonstrate that the plaintiff has failed to meet the
burden of proof, a defendant may rely on affirmative defenses. In her
article, The Litigation Privilege: Its Place in Contemporary
Jurisprudence, Professor Louise Hill examines the justification and
reach of the litigation privilege.27 She also analyzes cases where the
privilege has been asserted, as well as situations when the defendant-
lawyer could have been more successful had the lawyer asserted the
privilege. Because the litigation privilege can play a key role in the
defense of claims asserted by litigation adversaries, Professor Hill's
article advances the understanding of when litigators can zealously
represent their clients and still have immunity for litigation-related
statements and conduct.28
In legal ethics and malpractice circles, there is also uncertainty and
confusion created by the interplay of the provisions of Rule 1.6 and Rule
4.1 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules").
Peter R. Jarvis and Trisha M. Rich analyze these rules in The Law of
Unintended Consequences: Whether and When Mandatory Disclosure
Under Model Rule 4.1(b) Trumps Discretionary Disclosure Under
Model Rule 1.6(b).29 Although the interplay of the rules can be
circuitous, Mr. Jarvis and Ms. Rich do an outstanding job of dissecting
the language of the two rules and suggesting interpretations that
reconcile the two rules. In addition to considering the disciplinary
consequences, they also help the reader understand the very serious
and the control condition as "modest").
26. Id.
27. Louise Lark Hill, The Litigation Privilege: Its Place in Contemporary Jurisprudence, 44
HOFSTRA L. REV. 401 (2016).
28. Id. at 402-08; see also FORTNEY & JOHNSON, supra note 19, at 242-44 (reviewing
different jurisdictional approaches to applying the litigation privilege).
29. Peter R. Jarvis & Tricia M. Rich, The Law of Unintended Consequences: Whether and
When Mandatory Disclosure Under Model Rule 4.1(b) Trumps Discretionary Disclosure Under
Model Rule 1.6(b), 44 HOFSTRA L. REv. 421 (2016).
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malpractice consequences if Rule 4.1 is interpreted broadly as turning
discretionary disclosures into mandatory ones.30 Understanding this
possibility, they make a compelling argument for amending disciplinary
rules to eliminate the risk that a lawyer could be held civilly liable for
not making disclosures to a non-client when the disclosure is
discretionary under the applicable confidentiality rule.31
Another malpractice-related concern that merits clarification is the
question of when a lawyer has a duty to report the lawyer's own
malpractice to a client. In a 2009 law review article, Professor Benjamin
P. Cooper examined a lawyer's ethical duty to report his own
malpractice to a client.32 In his article published in this Issue, When
Clients Sue Their Lawyers for Failing to Report Their Own Malpractice,
Professor Cooper turns to the civil liability exposure for lawyers who
fail to report their malpractice to their clients.33 Distinguishing breach of
fiduciary duty and negligence claims, Professor Cooper persuasively
reasons why clients should be able to obtain fee forfeitures when their
lawyer breaches the fiduciary duty of loyalty by failing to report to the
client the lawyer's own malpractice. The lack of clarity regarding when
lawyers have a duty to report has created confusion for both lawyers and
clients. Professor Cooper advances our understanding of how the
fiduciary nature of the attorney-client relationship should compel
lawyers to put clients' interests before their own when it comes to
disclosing the lawyer's own malpractice.
Around the United States, persons injured by legal malpractice are
often left without a remedy. Legal malpractice cases are frequently
expensive and difficult to try. The amount of damages may not be large
enough to persuade a plaintiffs attorney to represent the injured person
on a contingent fee basis. Even when the damages are large enough, a
malpractice case may not be pursued if there are limited assets or
insurance to cover a judgment or settlement. When malpractice cases are
brought, various legal rules work to the advantage of the defendant-
lawyer.34 As a result, a traditional legal malpractice action may provide
little compensation to those harmed by lawyer malpractice. As an
alternative to our current liability regime for malpractice claims,
30. Id. at431-37.
31. Id.
32. Benjamin P. Cooper, The Lawyer's Duty to Inform His Client of His Own Malpractice, 61
BAYLOR L. REV. 174, 180-88 (2009).
33. Benjamin P. Cooper, When Clients Sue Their Lawyers for Failing to Report Their Own
Malpractice, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 441 (2016).
34. See Benjamin H. Barton, Do Judges Systematically Favor the Interests of the Legal
Profession?, 59 ALA. L. REV. 453, 491-503 (2008) (discussing a number of common law and
procedural rules that benefit defendants in legal malpractice actions).
2015]
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Professor Melissa Mortazavi, in her article, A No-Fault Remedy for
Legal Malpractice?, explores a no-fault approach to adjusting legal
malpractice claims.35 Professor Mortazavi draws on the experience of
no-fault regimes in other contexts to argue implementation of such a
system for select types of legal malpractice claims. Her creative
approach should inspire others to rethink the traditional approaches and
to consider new possibilities that may be more efficient and fairer to
both injured persons and alleged tortfeasors.
In addition to being named as defendants in legal malpractice suits,
lawyers commonly are targets in motions to disqualify counsel. On
many different levels, responding to disqualification motions can be very
costly. As James B. Kobak, Jr. notes in his article, Dealing with
Conflicts and Disqualification Risk Professionally, the serious
consequences of disqualification motions go beyond the fact of
disqualification itself.36 In his article, Mr. Kobak provides a balanced
and scholarly, yet practical, discussion of the common bases for
disqualification motions. He astutely analyzes the recent court decisions,
using a helpful framework for recognizing the types of conflicts that
provide a basis for disqualification motions. Anyone dealing with a
disqualification motion would be well-advised to consult Mr. Kobak's
thoughtful article. Finally, jurists and policy makers should seriously
consider his recommendations on limiting the concurrent conflict and
imputation rules.
The final contribution to this Issue is Professor Benjamin H.
Barton's article, Some Early Thoughts on Liability Standards for Online
Providers of Legal Services." As suggested by its title, the article
considers the liability of online providers of legal services and the issues
that courts will face if and when these lawsuits arise. In considering
possible lawsuits against online providers, Professor Barton discusses
four possible legal regimes that might apply to such actions: legal
malpractice, products liability, negligence, and breach of contract. After
discussing each area, he predicts that courts will apply the legal
malpractice standard of a "reasonable lawyer," but will not import the
procedural and causation protection that lawyers enjoy in legal
malpractice actions.
35. Melissa Mortazavi, A No-Fault Remedy for Legal Malpractice?, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 471
(2016).
36. James B. Kobak, Jr., Dealing with Conflicts and Disqualification Risk Professionally, 44
HOFSTRA L. REV. 497 (2016).
37. Benjamin H. Barton, Some Early Thoughts on Liability Standards for Online Providers of
Legal Services, 44 HoFSTRA L. REV. 541 (2016).
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Thanks to the Gross Lecture Fund for supporting the conference,
"Lawyers as Targets: Suing, Defending and Prosecuting Lawyers."
Thanks to the authors for their valuable contributions. And finally,
thank you to the late Professor Monroe H. Freedman for his
leadership in spearheading the Hofstra Ethics Conferences and for
his enduring inspiration.
